Predicted effects of invading Iraq

The neutrality of this article is disputed.

Predicted effects of invading Iraq are those predicted prior to the actual invasion, not those that actually happened, nor new effects alleged after the fact.

Prior to the invasion, global news sources reported the following possible, alleged, reputed or expected effects of the U.S. plan to invade Iraq. The interest was triggered by the American announcement that the plan would be executed in early 2003, "in weeks not months", as put by G. W. Bush. This was presumed to have either a strong positive or strong negative impact on world politics, depending on one's point of view and assumptions. This article presents a neutral list of the effects predicted by both supporters and detractors of the plan, prior to the event, as background to the main article on the Iraq crisis of 2003 - see its timeline for current events.

More effects are predicted by opponents of the plan than those favoring it. For balance, we present first the list of effects predicted by those favoring the plan, which include:

• regime change: the removal of Saddam Hussein and most likely the Ba'ath Party
• establishment of a representative democracy in Iraq, via an interim government
• ending the ongoing humanitarian crisis in the country, where, according to defectors, women are routinely raped by Iraqi soldiers, and men, women and children are often tortured and killed
• reducing the power of dictators elsewhere in Arabia, and beginning a general move towards democratization similar to that of Eastern Europe and Latin America.
• improving the security of Kuwait and enabling the removal of most US troops there
• formalizing the autonomous status of Iraqi Kurdistan (within limits imposed mostly by Turkey, as a condition for supporting the U.S. plan, i.e. not to partition Iraq itself).
• providing more autonomy for the Shi'a region of Southern Iraq (though not so much so that it threatens to unify politically with Iran or emulate its Shi'ite constitution)
• an investment policy of the G8 towards Iraq that would encourage rebuilding its economy
• an end to UN sanctions against Iraq which have resulted in substantial hardship there
• a victory in the War on Terrorism, ending Saddam's payments to families of Palestinian suicide bombers, and any threat that Saddam might ally actively with Al Qaeda
• an end to the threat that Saddam Hussein might attack or invade Iran (whom he fought in the Iran-Iraq War from 1980 to 1988), Kuwait (as he did in 1990 leading to the Gulf War), Saudi Arabia, Qatar, or Israel (which he attacked by missile in that war), in particular, doing so with chemical weapons (as he has used before), and biological weapons
• an end to the threat that Iraq might develop nuclear weapons, as it has sought to do in the past, and (the United States claims) it continues to do
• interviews with Iraqi scientists and measures taken to ensure that they do not renew work on such weapons for Islamist or rogue states, e.g. North Korea, which has already imported missile technology from Iran, and re-activated its nuclear reactors
• increased credibility for international laws against weapons of mass destruction
• additional pressure on Iran and North Korea who are trading in missile technology
• increased credibility for the G. W. Bush administration on containing the "Axis of Evil" (Iraq, Iran, North Korea) it characterized as threats in 2002
• a warning against other nations, e.g. Cuba, that the Bush administration has also accused of having or researching weapons of mass destruction
• leverage to impose or broker a solution to the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, by reducing the influence of Yasser Arafat and others who have allied with Saddam Hussein in the past (especially before 1991)
• increased credibility for the United Nations, or at least, no reduction of its influence
• a Pax Americana imposed by awareness of U.S. power deployed to back up the U.N. and especially the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, starting with 1441 by which Iraq is to be disarmed
• reduced oil prices - as of February 2003 these were inflating to reflect uncertainty of oil supply due to the potential of long-term interruption of flow of oil from Iraq

Opponents of the plan claimed to seek some of these same outcomes by means other than war. They often argued that some of the problems the U.S. plan seeks to overcome, such as high oil prices, challenges to the United Nations' authority, UN sanctions against Iraq of twelve years' standing, and high tensions between France, China, Russia and the US (these being three of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council), were all a direct or indirect result of US policies that have been in effect from at least 1986 and especially since 1991. Changing some of these policies, including removing U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia (as Al Qaeda and more recently some Saudi officials have also demanded), ending or relaxing sanctions that have had no effect on Saddam Hussein's grip on power, and respecting both the authority and pace of the United Nations, they argued, was likely to lead to reduced tension. Attacking Iraq on a US timetable they claimed would lead to:

negative ecological effects on the

• Persian Gulf watershed
• Tigris River watershed
• Euphrates River watershed
• Kuwait desert ecoregion - already badly damaged by actions by both sides in the Gulf War
• other ecoregions of Iraq and Kuwait that have hitherto escaped serious damage
• Caspian Sea watersheds especially if new oil pipelines are built
• water flow and soil quality of Kurdish, Arabian, and Shi'a agricultural regions of Iraq
• whole region due to release of chemical weapons or biological weapons by Iraq, or by accident
• whole region due to radiation poisoning due to depleted uranium ammunition or nuclear weapons (which the United States has threatened to use, especially on bunkers, despite evidence that use of these weapons on stocks of biological weapons are likely to spread rather than destroy them)

an increase in Islamist activity leading to

• a drop in world tourism, especially by air, as fears of Islamist retaliations rise
• a general increase in the credibility of Islamist claims that the United States seeks hegemony in the oil-producing regions of the Gulf.
• a resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan
• increased Al Qaeda recruiting in all countries where they are active
• attacks on UN forces in Afghanistan
• one or more Islamist revolutions in Arabia: Kuwait, Iraq, Jordan, Syria, and especially Saudi Arabia and Egypt - possibly supported from Iran, maybe as a distraction to avoid being invaded themselves
• threats to the political stability of Arabia especially the monarchies of Jordan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, as militant but not terrorist Islamists gain credibility, and especially if US, British, or Turkish forces remain anywhere in the region after the war
• a deteriorating relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia especially if Wahhabist Saudi Princes gain control of the country, and US forces remain in the region
• Islamist terrorism elsewhere, especially against American and British citizens
• attacks on, and suppression of, moderate figures in modern Islamic philosophy who might otherwise successfully limit Islamist influence

instability in Iraq after a war possibly including

• a humanitarian crisis in Iraq due to water, food, medicine and other war shortages
• collateral damage to civilian infrastructure, especially hospitals, roads and power grids
• incapacity of electronics due to electromagnetic pulse weapons used by the US, including emergency response vehicles, hospital equipment
• rebellion, sabotage and terrorism by the Ba'ath Party, with or without Saddam
• threats to Kurdistan as an independent region within Iraq
• renewed conflicts with Kurd in Iraq and Turkey if Baghdad or Ankara imposes any new limits
• interference by Turkey, Syria and Iran which also have Kurds in their populations
• war if Turkey renews its traditional claims to Mosul and other oil cities in the North of Iraq
• threats to ethnic Turkmens in Iraq and Kurdistan, especially if Turkey or Turkmenistan uses them as an excuse to interfere in Iraqi politics
• rebellion in Shi'a regions by forces seeking union with Iran (and/or other Persian influenced areas sometimes known as Greater Iran according to analyst Robert Kaplan).

drastic changes to the balance of power in the oil industry due to

• lost public ownership of Iraq's oil reserves, fields, infrastructure and contracts
• US, UK, and Turkish control of Iraq's oil supplies which presently flow mostly to Europe
• higher oil prices long-term due to US de facto control of world supply on the markets
• oil imperialism as Caspian Sea oil resources are developed under the control of the global military hegemony of the United States

dangerous diplomatic power shifts including

• a reduced role for international law, the world court and United Nations especially the United Nations Security Council - especially if these play little or no role in the war and aftermath - see The UN Security Council and the Iraq war
• loss of credibility for UN weapons inspectors if they are not able to finish their work
• a precedent of ignoring recommendations of UN humanitarian relief agencies in war plans, and as a factor in UN Security Council approval of future wars
• reduction in the role of NATO due to differences between US/UK and Eurasian views, conflicts with Turkey over the Kurds, and France's position against the US invasion
• increasing unity on the Iraq issue between France, Germany, Russia and China threatening to create a bloc on the UN Security council to block most US and UK actions
• loss of global tolerance of American leadership on questions of international relations
• a renewed reliance on war and assassination as legitimized means of resolving crises
• loss of the Arab League as a peace partner

negative domestic UK political impacts on the

• European Union's unity, especially on matters of global military conflict and NATO
• Labour Party of the UK - split between Cabinet (pro) and Commons (con)
• UK House of Commons' confidence in UK Prime Minister Tony Blair - which could lead to his dismissal by the majority and his replacement by another Labour Prime Minister
• US-UK relations especially if Blair loses power for supporting Bush's Iraq position
• credibility of the UK government and its handling of evidence in international decisions
  • 'student paper' fiasco

negative domestic US political impacts on the

• safety of American citizens travelling abroad
• United States Democratic Party - which has not openly or severely criticized Bush's plan
• U.S. Green Party - which is the only party clearly against the war, and gaining support due to the Democratic Party's lack of condemnation of the Bush unilateral policies
• role of Colin Powell within the G. W. Bush administration
• credibility of the US government and its handling of evidence in international decisions
  • Office of Strategic Influence fiasco
  • acceptance of US wiretap and satellite evidence by the UN (see technology issues below)
• prospects for re-election of Bush/Cheney in the U.S. presidential election, 2004
• relationship with Canada especially if they split on Iraq badly
• relationship with Mexico especially if they split on Iraq badly
• attitude of the U.S. public towards aid to dictators friendly to the U.S.
• world prestige of the US if things go badly or a large number of US troops are killed

destabilizing influence on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict due to

• increasing scrutiny on Israel under international law, especially regarding UN Security Council resolution adherence, and weapons of mass destruction
• increasing scrutiny on the status of West Bank settlers (or "colonists") who remain in defiance of other United Nations resolutions
• no motivation to renew the Oslo process between Israel and Palestinian Authority, as Yasser Arafat will lose influence, and there is no other clear leader to negotiate with

increasing fear in other nations not known for political stability or sanity, including

• North Korea, as a precedent for dealing with the "Axis of Evil"
• Pakistan especially regarding control of its nuclear weapons
• Iran the next Axis of Evil invasion candidate

negative impacts of the use of technology and public support for technology-focused wars, esp.

• American doctrine on nuclear weapon use and tolerance of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of other nations
• role of the Internet in mass media and forming of public opinion
• role of the Internet in the peace movement
• credibility of photo and audio and video evidence vs. forgeries or fakes
  • role of persuasion technology in general
• weapons development, especially nuclear weapons and anti-missile technology
• attitude of developed nations towards nuclear proliferation
• attitude of developing nations towards nuclear proliferation
• attitude of developed nations towards general spread of dual-use technology potentially useful to create weapons of mass destruction - especially if such nations feel that they can simply invade later if those technologies are put to uses they do not approve of

The predicted effects were often cited in United Nations actions regarding Iraq, popular opposition to war on Iraq and global protests against war on Iraq. As American popular opinion of war on Iraq has changed to reflect doubts about the outcomes of war, it forced the American government position on war on Iraq to change somewhat, and worldwide government positions on war on Iraq increasingly isolated the American push to war. In particular, the objections above caused significant rifts within the UK Labour Party, threatening a challenge to the leadership of Anthony Blair that, as of the end of June 2003, is still ongoing. Public relations plans for war on Iraq also changed to address dire predictions in the above. The U.S. plan to invade Iraq itself changed somewhat, with a decreased role for Turkey due to Kurdish concerns.

See also The UN Security Council and the Iraq war, and Iraq crisis of 2003, predicted effects of invading Iran, predicted effects of invading Syria, predicted effects of Kurdish separation from Iraq.